@article {1971126,
	title = {Analyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR},
	journal = {Management Science},
	year = {2020},
	month = {2020},
	address = {INFORMS},
	abstract = {We identify analysts{\textquoteright} information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) server activity to analysts{\textquoteright} brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24\% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts{\textquoteright} attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts{\textquoteright} incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts{\textquoteright} forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts{\textquoteright} use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.},
	keywords = {Finance},
	author = {Gibbons,Brian and Iliev,Peter and Kalodimos,Jonathan}
}
@article {1972121,
	title = {Governance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access},
	journal = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
	year = {2020},
	month = {2020},
	abstract = {We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit, and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already well-governed firms.},
	keywords = {Finance},
	author = {Bhandari,Tara and Iliev,Peter and Kalodimos,Jonathan}
}
@booklet {1972146,
	title = {Progress in Understanding Proxy Access and the Shareholder Proposal Process},
	year = {2017},
	month = {2017},
	keywords = {Finance},
	url = {https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/03/progress-in-understanding-proxy-access-and-the-shareholder-proposal-process/},
	author = {Kalodimos,Jonathan and Bhandari,Tara and Iliev,Peter}
}
@booklet {1972161,
	title = {Public versus Private Provision of Governance: The Case of Proxy Access},
	year = {2015},
	month = {2015},
	keywords = {Finance},
	url = {http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/10/01/public-versus-private-provision-of-governance-the-case-of-proxy-access/},
	author = {Kalodimos,Jonathan and Iliev,Peter and Bhandari,Tara}
}
