01319nas a2200169   4500008004100000245006600041210006400107260000900171300001000180490000700190520079300197653001200990100001601002700001801018700001601036856009701052       2021                        eng d00aShare Pledging, Payout Policy, and the Value of Cash Holdings0 aShare Pledging Payout Policy and the Value of Cash Holdings  c2021  a18-330 v613 aShare pledging for insiders’ personal bank loans is associated with the agency problems of insider risk aversion and stock price crash risk. We examine the relation between insider share pledging and the value of cash holdings using the pledging data of listed firms in Taiwan. We find that the value of cash holdings is lower for pledging firms, especially for those that are relatively more risk averse. Pledging firms that repurchase shares have a higher marginal value of cash than those with other payout methods, likely due to the role of repurchases in reducing the stock price crash risk. Our results show how insiders’ personal financing incentives arising from share pledging would affect the value of cash holdings from the perspective of agency problems and payout policy.10aFinance1 aChou, Robin1 aWang, Yu-Chun1 aYang, Jimmy  uhttps://business.oregonstate.edu/biblio/share-pledging-payout-policy-and-value-cash-holdings