TY - JOUR T1 - Executive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy JF - International Journal of Corporate Governance Y1 - 2014 A1 - Elston,Julie A1 - Rondi,Laura A1 - Bhattacharyya,Nalanaksha KW - Finance KW - OSU-Cascades AB - From a theoretical perspective, we posit that that dividend policies may be relevant in resolving agency issues even in a governance environment dominated by family controlled firms. Earlier research has found that in more market based systems such as the US and Canada, dividends are in fact instrumental in solving agency issues. Prior empirical research has also found that dividends have a role in mitigating agency conflicts in a bank-dominated corporate environments like that in Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This paper extends the findings of earlier research by empirically investigating whether dividends retain their importance as the mechanism for resolving residual agency issues in a family controlled governance environment like Italy VL - 5 CP - 3/4 U2 - a U4 - 19827521537 ID - 19827521537 ER -