Assistant Professor
Accounting

Heather Pesch

541-737-2517

peschh@oregonstate.edu

Overview
Overview
Background
Publications

Overview

Career Interests

Heather L. Pesch is an Assistant Professor of accounting at Oregon State University College of Business.

Prof. Pesch received her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin's School of Business in 2011. Prior to her doctoral studies, she worked as an auditor at Deloitte and in various financial reporting roles at three different Fortune 500 companies. Prof. Pesch has worked as a professor at the University of WIsconsin-Whitewater, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Prof. Pesch has taught auditing courses, introductory and intermediate financial reporting courses and cost accounting courses. 

Prof. Pesch's research focuses on how cognitive and social forces influence judgment and decision making, particularly with respect to social responsibility, misconduct and whistle-blowing. She is particularly interested in how individual behaviors and strategies within an organization can lead to emergent macro-level properties (e.g., organizational norms). Her research methods include experimentation and agent-based modeling (a type of computer simulation).

Accepted Papers:
"Selection benefits of below-market pay in social-mission organizations: effects on individual performance and team cooperation" with Clara Chen and Laura Wang. Accepted for publication at The Accounting Review

"Fraud dynamics and controls in organizations" with Jon Davis, 2013. Published in Accounting, Organizations and Society 38 (6-7) 469-483

Working Papers & Work in Process:
"The impact of internal controls on corrupt organizational norms". Preparing for submission to The Accounting Review.

"P-hacking and the quality of research in the top accounting journals"

"Understanding the impact of below-market pay in social-mission organizations" with Patrick Hurley

"Control systems and editorial times affecting the quality of research and academic careers in accounting" with Patrick Hurley and Ronen Gal-Or

"Executive charitable giving, occupational fraud, and whistle-blowing program" with Jeremy Lill and Brent Garza

"Forgiveness and its impact on organizational norms and fraud" with Pam Murphy

"Gender differences organizational citizenship behavior and related compensation" with Daisung Jang

"Performance measures: when to strive for control over the uncontrollable" "with Gary Hecht  

Background

Honors & Awards

Cycling, Snow-skiing, surfing, and any outdoor activity with a dog.

Publications

Academic Journal
Accounting

“Submit-to-Accept Delays in Accounting: Determinants, Comparisons to other Business Disciplines”

We use hand-collected data to analyze submission-to-acceptance (STA) times in the top-tier accounting journals relative to other top-tier business journals from 1993 through 2021. We find that, vis-à-vis other business disciplines, STA times at top-tier accounting journals were shorter in the first half of our sample period, and significantly longer thereafter. We also observe shorter STA times for articles with authors from more highly-ranked institutions; this effect exists only in top-tier accounting journals and has increased over time. In additional analyses, we find that our primary inferences are unchanged when considering maturity of initial journal submissions, journal-level democratization, and review-process improvements related to paper quality. Our results should be of interest to researchers, journal editors, reviewers, provosts, deans, and tenure and promotion committees.
Details
Academic Journal
Accounting

“Selection benefits of below-market pay in social-mission organizations: effects on individual performance and team cooperation”

Many organizations whose core purpose is to advance a social mission pay employees below-market wages. We investigate two under-appreciated benefits of below-market pay in these social-mission organizations. In a series of experiments, we predict and find that, holding employees’ outside opportunities constant, those attracted to social-mission organizations that pay below-market wages perform better individually and cooperate more effectively in teams than those attracted to social-mission organizations that pay higher wages. The individual performance effect arises because below-market pay facilitates the selection of value-congruent employees who are naturally inclined to work hard for the organizational mission. The team cooperation effect arises because employees expect team members who have selected a social-mission job that pays below market to be more value-congruent and, therefore, more cooperative than those who have selected a social-mission job that pays higher wages. Collectively, we demonstrate that in social-mission organizations, offering below-market pay can yield selection benefits.
Details