This study examines the role of the top management team (TMT) and governance structures in the use of corporate venture capital (CVC) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO). The study is unique in that it sheds light on governance-related antecedents of strategic decision making in such firms. We integrate the insights of behavioral agency and upper echelon perspectives to develop our hypotheses. Our results show that in the presence of non-duality, a negative curvilinear relationship exists between TMT heterogeneity and the use of CVC. We also find that TMT heterogeneity and ownership motivate the use of CVC but only up to a certain threshold. Our findings contribute to the literatures of entrepreneurship and strategy.
We examine how VCFs' forecast of an IPO exit affects their breadth of advising and the likelihood of founder–CEO replacement shortly after they invest in a new venture. Moreover, we examine how the expected time-to-exit moderates these relationships. Our findings show that the likelihood of founder–CEO replacement upon receiving venture capital funding is significantly greater if a VCF perceives this company as a potential IPO as opposed to a trade sale, and this likelihood increases if the forecasted time-to-exit is short. We also illustrate how the breadth of advice varies as a function of the forecasted IPO and time-to-exit.
